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This study investigates whether the Internet can become an effective tool for 
democratization and civic mobilization in a context where differentials in power relations 
are particularly sharp – the former Soviet Union. It offers the first two-way comparative 
study of new media’s democratising potential in two post-Soviet states, Ukraine and 
Belarus. Despite their location at the geographical centre of Europe these countries are 
marked by a somewhat fragmented academic inquiry, as most of research scholarship is 
centred on Russia (Fossato, 2009; Dubin, 2008; Oates, 2013). The cases of Ukraine and 
Belarus can, however, be extremely informative regarding the usage of new media and 
their democratic potential in transitional societies. This is particularly true given the 
countries’ diverging political pathways: Belarus is an authoritarian dictatorship or ‘the 
last dictatorship of Europe’ (Rausing, 2012) governed by President A. Lukashenko since 
1994; Ukraine is an aspiring democracy, which potentially can be taken over by a 
creeping or competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2010)1. The comparison is 
particularly timely, not least given recent upheavals in Ukraine including the ousting of 
President Yanukovich and the annexation of Crimea by Russia (Harding, 2014). 
The overarching goal of this article is to evaluate new media’s role in generating a 
counter-force or an alternative public space in the so-called ‘buffer zone’ between the EU 
and Russia. The potential of new media in Ukraine and Belarus to foster civic 
engagement and social change can be assessed by investigating how citizens in these two 
countries use, produce and relate to political satire online. Specifically, this involves a 
number of tasks: (a) uncovering the emerging modes of usage of new media in 
semi/authoritarian states, (b) contextualizing how national socio-political systems shape 
the democratic potential of the new media architecture and (c) exploring the potential of 
new media for undercutting the existing status quo in the societies in question. Issues of 
broader concern are whether the Internet will be able to fill the democratic gap in 
transitional semi/authoritarian states and whether it can challenge the norm of 
government control and self-censorship. 
The focus on political satire is particularly instructive, as its subversive nature is 
mutable with regard to different governmental practices, historical contexts and media 
forms. Recent interaction of the genre with technology (online practices) produces further 
subtleties of expression. It not only explicates particular national sensibilities but also the 
nature of ironic ‘resistance’ within the national off- and on-line context. As a result, 
studying political satire online can reveal both sites of subversion and modes of usage of 
new media. The article starts with a brief overview of the nature of post-Soviet countries 
and an analysis of new media’s democratic potential in the region. This is followed by a 
discussion of the post/Soviet legacy of political satire and an introduction to the study’s 
methodological approach. Then the case studies of online political satire in Ukraine and 
Belarus are presented and analysed. The conclusion problematizes the findings and 
outlines future directions for scholarly inquiry. 
 
Contextualising the study 
  
The role of new media, which were expected to become a leading force in the 
transformation process in semi/authoritarian states, has yet to receive a full assessment. 
Among factors preventing successful development of an engaged online community in 
the region is the transitional (or ‘adjusting’ as Dubin (2008) puts it) nature of the post-
Soviet societies. The essentially horizontal communication network galvanized by the 
rise of the Internet requires a corresponding vertical structure of credible institutions, 
which is missing in the region. The countries in question simulate the institutions and 
processes of the democratic model; to use Wilson’s terminology (1995) they are close to 
‘virtual democracies’. My focus on new media’s role in democratic development 
foregrounds pluralism and civil society building, omitting democracy’s other ‘building 
blocks’ such as contested elections, separation of powers, rule of law, etc.  
State control over traditional media and media self-censorship are pervasive in the 
region, with the exception of Ukraine, which maintains relative pluralism among 
traditional media outlets (Dyczok 2009). Such socio-political environments, combined 
with the low-cost ability of the Internet to aggregate interest groups, make online 
platforms (almost) the only available/remaining public space to exercise local governance 
and counteract the forces blocking democratization.2 However, opportunities transpiring 
from new media’s horizontal (hence in theory more inclusive) architecture go hand in 
hand with the challenges of the new media infrastructure. 
 Among limitations to online engagement are low Internet penetration and high 
cost of Internet usage. These vary from country to country: in 2012, allegedly, 
approximately half of the 9.7 million population of Belarus uses the Internet (47%). In 
Ukraine users total 34% among the population of over 45 million, but only large cities 
boast high numbers (Freedom House, 2013). In both countries, it is predominantly a 
young to middle-aged, urban, educated and relatively well-off cohort that seems to 
benefit most from ICTs. This is especially the case as the Internet becomes more 
accessible and affordable via mobile devices. For instance, 36% of Ukraine’s urban 
population accesses the Internet via a mobile phone or smartphone (Kievstar, 2013). The 
current rate of approximately 24% of Belarusian mobile Internet users is expected to 
grow rapidly as the 3G standard becomes more affordable (Pet’ko, 2013). Despite 
‘uneven’ Internet penetration (the rural vs. urban divide) and its relative affordability, it 
can be considered a ‘mass’ medium in both countries.  
However, digital divides in these countries are more complex than that. The fall of 
the USSR resulted in peculiar attitudes towards democratic values3, which can translate 
into low online activism and a narrow set of issues of public concern. Online practices 
should be placed in the context of the post-Soviet legacy, in which personal networks are 
generally deemed more important (Ledeneva, 1998) than governmental or even civic 
organisations. As a result patterns of Internet usage are embedded within informal offline 
networks. Online users tend to seek (legal, etc.) advice via established informal networks 
and to engage in discussions within confined online circles4. The practices and tools 
taken up by networked individuals are constrained further by weak civil society, which 
manifests itself in self-censorship and mistrust5. Thus, the growing fragmentation and 
atomisation of post-Soviet subjects exerts an impact on online civic engagement in the 
region. 
An additional dilemma related to the democratising potential of the Internet is its 
regulation. The ecology of freedom of expression online is changing and at times it can 
be enhanced/eroded indirectly by the pursuit of other goals in wider society. It can be 
triggered by user-centred or net-centred concerns, as well as by various stakeholders’ 
interests (Dutton et. al., 2011). In semi/authoritarian states the establishment of firm 
control over all forms of information flows is an ultimate goal. These governments 
embark on a defensive strategy, adopting stringent legislation, securing centralised access 
and control over external connections. According to the latest Freedom House report 
(2013:8) Ukraine and Belarus have adopted the SORM ICT monitoring system used in 
Russia and subsequently introduced legislation expanding their surveillance powers. 
The situation, however, is far from straightforward. Semi-authoritarian states are 
using more and more sophisticated methods of control over the Internet. In addition to the 
first generation of control mechanisms (such as surveillance of internet cafes and 
filtering), they now employ more sophisticated tools. The second generation of control 
includes the use of a legal and normative environment to block access to information, as 
argued by Deibert and Rohozinski (2010). One of the most recent examples of this 
approach in Belarus is a 2010 regulation ‘obliging compulsory registration of all websites 
and the collection of personal data in Belarus’ (EDRI-gram, 2010). Third-generation 
mechanisms include ‘active surveillance and data mining’ (Deibert and Rohozinski, 
2010:27), as well as state-sponsored information campaigns encompassing dissemination 
of propaganda, kompromat (compromising material) and disinformation online. In other 
words, it involves the use of new media by the state both for crude and subversive 
propaganda.  
Some of these ‘subversive’ tactics involve dissemination of images of stability 
and promotion of affordable (or free) entertainment, such as access to the latest films or 
TV shows online. In addition to the infotainment tactic, cyberspace can be used to evoke 
a feeling of affinity with the regime via subtle or indirect promotion of a pro-state agenda 
(sometimes with the help of satirical genre as an example in the next section clarifies). It 
can be used as a tool for managed dissent as well. The latter tactic presupposes certain 
toleration of critical viewpoints disseminated online, going beyond what is permitted on 
air. By providing a monitored online space for a public ‘outburst’, the regime ensures that 
it does not spill offline, pinpoints the relevant ‘hot-spots’ and encourage ‘slacktivism’, a 
feel-good online activism that has zero political or social impact (Morozov, 2011). 
Subversive online manoeuvres can be practiced by various actors. The cases of 
grassroots online political satire discussed in the article explicate the difficulties involved 
in controlling information flows online and contextualize challenges to semi-authoritarian 
governments seeking to maintain control over media output and reception. First, 
however, I will briefly outline the Soviet legacy regarding the production and 
consumption of political satire. 
 
(Post)Soviet political satire  
 
The broad notion of satire can be defined as a rhetorical strategy which employs 
ridicule, irony and other means to offer social criticism and potentially trigger an 
improvement of individuals, societies, etc. (Elliot, 2004). It can be seen as a force that is 
potentially able to challenge the status quo, so it is feared by those in power. Jesters and 
fools were among the first representatives of political satire (Lerner, 2009; Partan, 2007) 
as they openly articulated grassroots dissent towards ‘rulers’ in a mocking, provocative 
and/or ironic manner. In a way, it is similar to Bakhtinian carnival (1981), which inverts 
rules and traditions and opens space for ‘low’ culture, thus implicitly questioning power 
relations. This indirect ‘confrontation’ with and subversive resistance to authority via 
playful, ironic and attention-grabbing satire engenders support among the ‘demos’. 
Furthermore, this ‘comic over-exaggeration’ can potentially transform the passive 
recipient of a satirical message into a ‘potential actor’ (Knight, 2008:104), as dispersed 
individuals identify common ground and may unify into a politicised community (Day, 
2011:145). Online political satire is a manifestation of participatory popular culture 
which, by employing an ironic strategy online, is capable of revealing shared 
understandings of inner ideological contradictions and can therefore potentially challenge 
established power structures. 
Political satire had a long tradition in the USSR permeating a number of genres. 
Despite censorship, surveillance and the threat of prosecution, the culture of political 
satire in the form of a short story/joke with a punch line or anekdot proliferated during 
the Soviet period. It remains popular to this day, as numerous websites aggregating old 
and new anekdoty indicate (anekdot.ru, anekdotov.net, etc.). Some other cases of political 
satire included literary satirists (M. Zoshchenko, M. Bulgakov and others), popular 
comedians (e.g. M. Zhvanetsky, A. Raikin, etc.), satirical comedy/short film series (e.g. 
the satirical TV journal Fitil, Fuse; the film from the 1920s called Tret'ia Meshchanskaia, 
Three in Bed) and magazines (Krokodil, Crocodile). In a more or less unified ideological 
realm of the Soviet Union, comedians often relied on the public’s ability and inclination 
to ‘read between the lines’ and resorted to subversive use of state propaganda and subtle 
jokes such as playing on their over-exaggerated devotion to the party line bordering on 
steb. Following Yurchak, steb is a ‘form of irony that differed from sarcasm, cynicism, 
derision, or any of the more familiar genres of absurd humor’ (2006: 250). What makes 
steb slightly different from sarcasm is the ambivalence of irony displayed, as one is left to 
wonder whether the ironic aesthetic practice is a support, ridicule or mixture of the two. 
After fall of the USSR a number of changes in political satire occurred. The case of post-
soviet Russia is used here to highlight them. Proliferation of new satirical programmes 
employing various genres was one of the transformations (e.g. a political puppet TV 
show called Kukly or Puppets (1994-2002), the Russian equivalent of the UK’s Spitting 
Image, by the scriptwriter Viktor Shenderovich, and a computer-animated show Tushite 
Svet (Switch off the light), 2000-2004). However, these shows were later cancelled and 
replaced with more apolitical stand-up comedians such as E. Petrosian, M. Galkin and the 
Novye Russkie Babki (Beumers et. al. 2008:45) as well as quasi-satirical programmes. 
One of the most recent examples of quasi-satire is the show Mul’tlichnosti (Cartoon 
personalities) broadcast on the mainstream state television Channel One and available 
online (on the Channel’s official website, YouTube, etc.). This cartoon (2009-2013) 
featured various political and celebrity figures from both the national and international 
scene. In one of the most popular episodes puppets representing Vladimir Putin and 
Dmitry Medvedev are dancing and singing satirical verses (known as chastushki) as a 
2010 New Year message to the nation. Interestingly, the abovementioned show Kukly 
was closed in 2002 precisely for political satire involving Putin’s puppet. Mul’tlichnosti 
used a similar plot for its New Year episodes in 2011 and 2012, which enjoyed similar 
popularity (Putin and Medvedev, 2012).  
This attempt by the Russian state to use the Internet to expand its communicative 
power and shape popular opinion was only partially successful. As a case of state-
sanctioned satire, Mul’tlichnosti received quite a mixed welcome online. Here I quote 
only some of the critical comments on the Channel One website: cheap product; The 
programme is so boring. Everything is so stretched, flat and over-used; Undeniably, this 
is an ideological weapon/an illusion of democracy/a very useful maneuver/an example of 
stupidity and idiocy! As it was shown at Channel One, it was sanctioned by his 
Majesty(ies) (!)(Pervyi kanal, n.d.). Thus, by creating an online archive of Mul’tlichnosti 
cartoons and encouraging forum discussion, the state uses media convergence (as well as 
the fact that TV still remains the most popular media in the region) as a tool to co-opt 
alternative voices and to authenticate official meanings. 
Following the introduction of quasi-satire and the general de-politicization of 
traditional media in the post-Soviet region,6 political satire mostly proliferates online. 
Besides the popularity of satirical items originating in the Soviet era (such as Krokodil, 
which is now available online), there is a continuation of the post/Soviet satirical legacy 
online albeit in a different form and genre. For instance, Ryazanova-Clarke establishes 
that a series of blogs display a generic connection with both the 1990s television show 
Kukly and the satirical Soviet TV journal Fitil (2010). However, it is difficult to comment 
on generational differences in attitude towards this and other cases of online political 
satire mentioned here due to the lack of available data. 
As a recent report shows, ‘the explosion in political satire’ (Kovalev, 2011) means 
that it is becoming more and more difficult for the Russian state to regulate its production 
and dissemination. The establishment risks losing control over ‘multiple readings’ of 
released ‘state-authorised’ images and other artefacts. As the case of grassroots ironical 
alteration of bare-chested photographs of Putin illustrates, online political satire is at 
times able to ‘contaminate’ the dominant state-sanctioned viewpoint. After this short 
account of subversive potential of political satire in Russia I will now turn to the 
neighbouring Belarus and Ukraine. I will explicate how citizens in these countries relate 
to political satire online and whether the new media can become an alternative public 




The socio-cultural and historical context of political humour outlined above raises a 
number of questions. How do citizens use, produce and relate to online political satire in 
Ukraine and Belarus? What can the case of online political satire tell us about civic 
grassroots activism in the region? Are incumbent regimes successful in manipulating, 
assimilating various satirical voices and/or pushing them to the margins? How do the 
states in question (i) address an implicit ‘Other/s’ in online communication and (ii) 
attempt to accommodate the ideological ‘Other’ online (in order to invalidate it)?  
This study adopts an issue driven approach. It looks at the most prominent cases of 
political satire as they emerge online (in blogs, on social networking sites, etc.). The 
cases of political satire (relevant for the Ukrainian and Belarusian community) have been 
identified based on the researcher’s knowledge of the region and media monitoring (such 
as tracking viral satirical videos, images, and memes). The most prominent cases are 
analysed against other user-generated content on the issue (such as comments) and 
reaction from the state (where applicable). I examine the linguistic and visual aspects of 
online political satire, as well as identify patterns of development of political satire in the 
post-Soviet region. 
The audience of online satire in the region can be described as relatively young, 
urban, educated, well-off and politically engaged. Having said that, the growing 
affordability of mobile internet and the rapidly changing political environment (for 
instance, public dissatisfaction with the abrupt reversal of European integration and a 
wave of protests started on 21st November 2013 in Kiev called Euromaidan) have 
dramatically increased both the ‘reach’ and appeal of online satire and ironic resistance. 
Furthermore, distribution of political satire via traditional media channels (DVDs, etc.) 
ensures wider dissemination and diversifies its potential audience. Where possible, 
deliberation about the ‘creators’ of online satire is offered. Obviously, it is not always 
viable to establish precisely who is generating the satire. However, it is possible to 
comment on whose political/social interests the satire represents. Some of the examples 
discussed below indicate that satirical outputs might be predominantly targeting a male 
audience, playing on gender stereotypes of quasi-modern Ukrainian and Belarusian 
society. 
The longitudinal analysis of online political satire in two states embraces a 10-year 
span (2004-2013). During this time, the political environment endured certain alterations, 
especially in Ukraine, where the Orange revolution’s president Viktor Yushchenko was 
succeeded by a more pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych. (Although recent political 
upheaval in Ukraine such as Euromaindan, ousting of V. Yanukovich, military conflict in 
some parts of Ukraine and election of the new president—Petro Poroshenko, go beyond 
the scope of this analysis I will briefly reflect on the types of political satire they 
inspired). The degree of media freedom in both countries also fluctuated. The recent 
decline in media freedom (including the Internet) in Ukraine from ‘free’ to ‘partly free’ 
(Freedom House, 2013a) is useful in clarifying the findings (and trends). In turn, 
technical attacks against alternative media websites, arrests of bloggers and prosecution 
of media practitioners in Belarusian ‘not free’ mediascape (Freedom House, 2013b) help 
contextualise the findings further. 
The analysis is structured as follows. Firstly, the type of ‘alternative’ satirical 
content available online within the ten year period in each state is surveyed. The modes 
of use and fluctuation in popularity of certain types of satire are explained. Finally, this 
analysis is contextualised within the wider context of media convergence, information 
flows and different governments’ approaches to managing online political satire. 
 
 




In contrast to the Russian ‘state-sanctioned’ satirical cartoons mentioned above, the 
Ukrainian online sphere has generated similar initiatives from below. Such factors as 
diverse media ownership, a more pluralistic political environment and charismatic 
political figures have been conducive for this. A series of politically themed cartoons 
were triggered by events during the 2004 presidential campaign, when one of the 
presidential candidates (V. Yanukovych) had an egg thrown at him and tumbled to the 
ground. The cartoon Veseli Yaytsia (Merry Eggs) created by a former military interpreter 
and Ukrainian consul to Israel, Dmitry Chekalkin, was extremely popular during the 
campaign (Kuzio, 2006). It featured two eggs telling jokes and singing. Another creation 
from the same author was a thirteen-episode Internet film inspired by Yanukovych’s 
misspelling of his former vocation (Operation ProFFessor) comprising clips from 
popular Soviet comedies and impersonating well-known national politicians. 
In this and other instances discussed below it is quite difficult to establish the 
popularity of online satire. In some cases the number of viewings, re-postings or 
commentaries might be informative. However, in 2004 Internet accessibility was quite 
limited and dissemination of political satire involved traditional media (e.g. Operation 
ProFFessor was predominantly disseminated via DVDs as the first comment under the 
clip indicates: Veseli Yaytsia: Operatsiia Proffessor (9-15 series) (n.d.)). Moreover, the 
ephemerality of new media and varying degrees of control over online output mean that 
some of the satirical products are no longer available online (e.g. a website containing 
anekdoty about Yanukovych called yanukovych.nm.ru) or have been reposted (e.g. some 
of the YouTube clips were removed but later on re-uploaded, thus distorting the accuracy 
of viewing counts). Therefore, where possible, the nature of the establishment’s response 
(i.e. prosecution of authors, censorship of items, etc.) to cases of online political satire is 
used here to draw inferences about their popularity. 
Alongside these cartoons, other satirical political parodies gained high ratings. They 
included ‘projects’ involving Yulia Tymoshenko (especially during her time as prime-
minister in 2005 and then after 2007). Some of the satirical images made fun of her hair 
style (a French plait) which was presented as a tool of torture (a means to hang a 
person/country), a halo, a moustache, a symbol of a loaf of bread or an emblem of the 
USSR, etc. (Yulia Tymoshenko’s plait, 2011; Photozhaba on Yulia Tymoshenko, n.d.). 
As the only prominent female politician in Ukrainian quasi-patriarchal society 
Tymoshenko is an easy target of satire. Even during her imprisonment (2011-2014) she 
remained a fruitful source for political jokes (e.g. a series of cartoons depicting her 
‘luxurious’ life in prison is presumably promoted by her political rivals). One of the most 
popular episodes has had more than 450,000 views since May 2012 (Yulia Tymoshenko 
v kolonii, 2012). 
The change of political climate (such as the decline of support for the Orange 
Revolution) increased the popularity of another cartoon, Mr. Freeman. It originates in 
Ru-net (Russian internet) and deals with a wide range of everyday issues, problematizing 
citizens’ duties and responsibilities. A series of black and white cartoons featuring Mr. 
Freeman narrating in a monologue that first appeared on YouTube in 2009 and has 
continued (albeit with some irregularity) to date. Due to its popularity it was dubbed into 
Ukrainian in 2010. However, recent ‘success stories’ of online political satire go beyond 
cartoons. The emergence of fake accounts of politicians on the most famous part of the 
blogosphere—Livejournal—constitute another type of viral satire. The parodical 
appropriation of the identity of N. Azarov (Prime Minister 2010-2014) is a prominent 
example.  
Currently, the most engaging types of political satire among the online community 
involve genres which require little time for production and consumption. They are so-
called photozhaby or Photo Toads (creative digital alteration of images). This trend is 
similar to one in Belarus discussed below. Their main ‘heroes’ (similarly to the cartoons) 
are national political figures such as V. Yanukovych (e.g. an accident with the wreath 
falling on the president during an official ceremony in 2010) or Y. Tymoshenko during 
different stages of her political career.  
Alongside the diversification of grassroots political satire online, its 
commercialization and potential de-politicisation are also taking place. Citizen-driven 
online satirical activism is now aligning with commercial political projects. One example 
is the project Paraska Info, which was inspired by an Orange Revolution supporter called 
Paraska (an old lady who became a symbol of the revolution and subsequently a member 
of the party ‘Our Ukraine’), but later on became part of the political establishment. 
Online competitions for the best satirical image announced by some portals have 
followed a similar trend. However, an easier production and dissemination of any 
satirical output online (anekdot, video, photo, etc.) can turn activism into merely a 
‘virtual struggle’. One instance when online satirical engagement becomes more alluring 
and can potentially substitute offline involvement is the web project (a website-
aggregator) called Durdom or Madhouse, which had four million visits in 2012 
(Butchenko, 2013). A slightly different route was adopted by D. Chekalkin who has 
recently branched out into a realm of wider satire. Now the creator of Merry Eggs states 
that ‘the novelty of overtly political content’ wore off, and Ukrainians need an apolitical 
humour (Chekalkin, 2009).  
The factor of media convergence should be taken into account, as in many cases 
online activists use official TV footage (e.g. the incident with the wreath falling on the 
president) as inspiration for their satire. Other (offline) artifacts can also inform them, 
such as images of a Ukrainian graffiti artist known as Ukrainian Banksy. The 
transnational cultural flow complicates the dynamic further: examples include Ukrainian 
politicians being represented as Disney cartoon characters (Sukhomlin, n.d.) and the 
influence of Ru-net (Mr. Freeman cartoon). 
After the 2010 presidential elections the state moved towards cruder media control 
(to ensure ownership over definitions), which has manifested in overt pressure on the 
most active bloggers. For example, bloggers who published a mocking video of the 
wreath incident were firmly advised to delete it. Despite tightening of media regulations, 
new cases of online political satire emerge now and then. One example is a Facebook 
group called The Church of Witnesses of Improvement (Tserkov’ Svidetelei 
Pokrasheniya), which posts satirical pictures in response to current political events. 
However, as its organiser wished to remain anonymous, it illustrates the trend towards 
increasing self-censorship in Ukrainian society (Butchenko, 2013).  
There have also been attempts to appropriate the tools of counter-discourse 
proliferating online, just as in Russia, where a ‘safer’ version of political satire—
Mul’tlichnosti—was created. However, these attempts do not come from the regime. 
Rather, they are triggered by the nature of Ukraine’s political establishment, which is 
based on competition between various political groupings and a desire to discredit 
opponents. One recent example is the satirical cartoon Fairy-tail Rus’ (Skazochnaya Rus’) 
created by the Kvartal-95 group and broadcast on TV channel 1+1 (this channel, which is 
owned by tycoon I.V. Kolomoyskyi, covers 95% of the state’s territory and typically 
comes second in popularity ratings). Among its characters it features then President 
Yanukovich who wears a track suit, a surzhik-speaking (mixed Russian and Ukrainian 
language) Prime-Minister Azarov and an imprisoned Tymoshenko. The cartoon boosted 
the rating of the channel and the TV programme (Vechernij Kiev) on which it was 
broadcast. Some of the episodes boast high popularity online (Butchenko, 2013). 
Ukrainian new media enjoy relative freedom compared to their counterparts in 
Belarus and Russia. This is reflected in the proliferation of political satire and online 
activism driven by (recent) political events. The abundance of the graffiti during 
Euromaidan (Strokan, 2013), images involving Tymoshenko; dark humour on 
Yanukovich and Special Forces; and other numerous examples (Facebook, 2013; Miller, 
2014) will constitute fruitful grounds for future research. On the basis of pre-Euromaidan 
events the following deductions are in order. On the one hand, the introduction of recent 
overt controls in the Ukrainian online mediascape indicates the state’s desire to control 
diversity among voices online. On the other hand, subversive control is somewhat 
withheld, as the regime might be considering the pros and cons of such a policy and the 
dangers of appropriating oppositional satire for the system. In other words, it might be 
easier to accommodate the ideological ‘Other’ online (in order to invalidate it) by using 
familiar strategies: infotainment, commercialisation and competition, simultaneously 
allowing a plurality of voices and triggering further fragmentation of the online 
community. It remains to be seen what tactics the new establishment under the leadership 




State control over the media in Belarus is much more pronounced than in Russia or 
Ukraine. During the last ten years it has included such stringent measures as a 
requirement to show ID in order to browse the Internet in public cyber cafes and equating 
the idea of flash mobs (organised via the Internet) with picketing (Russia Today, 2011). 
State regulation of traditional media ranges from overt controls (such as selected 
censorship of Russian TV channels) to covert ones. One recent example was the 
introduction of a short-lived satirical show Kuhnia (Kitchen) before the 2010 elections. 
The show, which is extremely similar to Russia’s Projektorperishilton (n.d.), played on 
the Soviet phenomenon of kuhnia, where people could discuss with friends recent 
political affairs and tell anecdotes in private. Its cloned format and contrived existence is 
spelled out by commentators in online articles (Ganevich, 2010; Petrovskaya, 2010). Like 
Russian Mul’tlichnosti, such state-sanctioned political satire imposed from the top is 
perceived as reinforcing certain political viewpoints and failing to work. 
Even in this climate (or in spite of it) one can observe sporadic manifestations of 
political satire online. One of the most prominent cases of grassroots political satire in 
Belarus is a series of cartoons Multclub (2005) created by Oleg Minich and a group of 
activists called Third Way Community. They featured a number of political leaders, 
predominantly national actors (rather than foreign politicians or celebrity figures as in 
Mul’tlichnosti). The cartoons were deliberately made in a crude amateur-like animation 
form, linking them to homely low-tech contemporary art. They were welcomed and 
virally spread by various means (such as Internet, DVDs, flash drives, etc.) but not 
extensively commented on by the online community. As government pressure on the 
cartoon creator increased (he was threatened with imprisonment) he left the country for 
Western Europe (Grekov, 2013).  
Other viral online satire of that time was text-based, such as the hip-hop poem 
‘Zianon’ (named after an oppositional figure particularly influential in Belarus right after 
the collapse of the USSR, who is now exiled). Grasping the radical indeterminacy of new 
media, the author/s of the poem played with the sub-culture of hip-hop (perceived to be a 
dynamic and/or alien influence within the highly homogenous state-controlled cultural 
realm) in order to strengthen its rebellious potential and increase it authenticating force. 
On the one hand, the fact that it is no longer available online indicates that its subversive 
power was acknowledged by the regime. On the other hand, lack of any documented 
proof makes it impossible to estimate its popularity (at that time). 
Other cases of bottom-up online participation include the animated duet of Sasha i 
Siarozha (a project of two famous musicians) and Belzhaba (Belarusian toad), which 
contains a selection of ironical (digitally altered) photographs related to current socio-
economic and political affairs and actors. For a number of years these projects struggled 
to survive, as they tended to be temporarily blocked (e.g. during election campaigns). 
Currently the archive of Belzhaba is no longer available and the website exists only as a 
Twitter feed. The same fate was encountered by a vast number of other developments or 
portals hosting political satire which are no longer available online. 
As in Ukraine, online satirical activism in Belarus is prone to fluctuations with 
occasional peaks trigged by various political events. The most prominent cases of recent 
online civic activity are related to political events (the legitimacy of national elections in 
2010 and the suppression of peaceful demonstrations during that electoral campaign) and 
the economic situation (rampant inflation and difficulties acquiring foreign currency for 
members of the general public). During the increase in grassroots activism which 
preceded the 2010 election, a satirical video by Ya. Shapchyts entitled ‘Hide your 
grandmother’s passport’ became extremely popular on Bynet (Belarusian internet). One 
of its YouTube versions called ‘Babushka’ (Grandma) has around 63 000 views 
(Babushka, 2010). The video played on the manipulation of elderly people’s votes and 
the title hints at a way of tackling it. Consistent with the state line, the video’s producer 
and one of its young actors were identified and forced from their jobs (an employee of 
Belarusian TV and a university drama coach respectively (Actor, 2010)).  
Despite the diversity of genres, the dynamic of online political satire production in 
Belarus has been gradually changing. More explicit and crude suppression of online 
activism, growing depoliticisation and self-censorship are reflected in the dearth of cases 
of satire. Furthermore, lack of resources results in substandard quality of output: e.g. a 
lacklustre cartoon by Minich called New Year wishes (New cartoon, 2011) had 70,000 
viewings on YouTube (Grekov, 2013). As in Ukraine (albeit for slightly different reasons 
which are mentioned above), there is a trend towards simplification of satirical tools: 
from more complex, time- and resource-consuming cartoons to satirical images which 
can be quickly produced singlehandedly by an IT-savvy user who cannot be very easily 
traced (one of the most recent cases is a collection ‘Something is not right’, 2014). 
Another trend, which can also be observed in Ukraine, is the emergence of various 
aggregators, websites where various humorous photos, videos, articles are collected. For 
instance, the Live Journal webpage Belpomoechka (Belarusian Trash) contains videos, 
photos of real life events, official propaganda posters, etc. The imagery might not be 
digitally altered but it was posted precisely because it contains certain ambiguity and it 
can be ‘read’ in a subversive way (By_Trash, n.d.)).  
This echoes the Soviet phenomenon of steb, mentioned above, as a way to deal 
with increasing self/censorship. Some projects tend to exaggerate their loyalty to the 
regime to the extent that it becomes dubious (e.g. a series of recent flash mobs organised 
via the internet, where people on the streets were praising the president). To some extent 
a project called Lu-net plays along similar lines. It creates a whole parallel internet which 
is supposed to celebrate the regime and serve as its mouthpiece. This ‘present’ for the 
president’s 53rd birthday consisted of four ‘services’: a video sharing site (LuTube), a 
search engine (Lundex), a blogging service (LuJournal) and a web portal (tut.lu) 
(Doroshevich, 2007). The ambiguity of online satirical messages means that political 
satire exists despite /due to the highly controlled media environment. 
Despite ongoing suppression of alternative media, the state’s control does not 
seem to be pervasive and all-encompassing. Several traditional media outlets that were 
banned have moved online, such as 34magazine and the newspaper Navinki. The title of 
the later outlet is based on a wordplay: news (novost’), the popular independent 
newspaper Naviny, and a satellite town of Minsk, Navinki, where a psychiatric hospital is 
located. The paper existed from 1998 to 2005, but from 2003 had to publish illegally. 
Before the 2010 elections the project was revived and found its new life online on 
LiveJournal (Bykovsky, 2010). The question of why these outlets are granted ‘second 
life’ online is open to speculation. Whether they are meant to be a ‘safety valve’ as 
outlets of ‘managed dissent’, or a convenient opportunity to monitor grassroots’ activism, 
remains to be seen. 
As in Ukraine, media content convergence is evident in the production of political 
satire. It ranges from extensive use of the Russian language to the ‘appropriation’ of 
imagery from Ru-net. Exposure to wider media flows is clear in manipulation of globally 
circulated images. For instance, the blogger E. Lipkovich published a photo of the band 
Rammstein from Kerrang magazine with the blogger inserted on the far right with a black 
censure tape across his eyes and the head of the Union of Writers, M. Charhinets, on the 
far left of the photo. Access to his blog was temporarily blocked (Photozhaba, 2011) and 
he faced criminal charges for desecrating a flag, which were later dropped. Allegedly, 
anonymous pranksters originally superimposed the face of the head of the Union of 
Writers onto that of a Rammstein member and changed the flag. One motivation was that 
Charhinets, who is also in charge of the country’s Public Morality Council, considered 
banning Rammstein’s performance in Minsk (Khvoin, 2012). Diverse members of the 
online audience would pick up on different subtleties of satirical expression in this 
particular meme (referring us to a broader issue, the critical audience). 
Clearly, the Belarusian state tends to use overt control mechanisms to address the 
implicit ‘Other/s’ in online communication. Ongoing monitoring of the Internet as a 
realm of political dissent has ranged from multilevel-routine search (certain words) to 
tracing users online, from monitoring in cybercafés to identifying and intimidating online 
activists (blogger Lipkovich, others.). It has resulted in the fragmentation of oppositional 
forces and a barren Internet landscape. Furthermore, pre-emptive surveillance or the 
omnipresent threat of penetration of ‘resistance’ circles enforces self-censorship among 
active members of the online community. As a result, the state neither makes nor needs to 
make attempts to accommodate the satirical ‘Other’ online in order to invalidate it. Thus, 
the democratic potential of the Internet is subverted by the state at a very early stage, as 
the potential of the Internet to promote democracy is hindered from the outset. 
Finally, it should be noted that the regime has gradually adopted a wider variety of 
methods of covert control (mostly outside the online sphere). It has moved beyond simple 
denial of the need to internalise peripheral voices (their suppression, as in the case of the 
‘grassroots’ cartoon/ists) to more subtle strategies, such as accounting for alternative 
narratives (e.g. co-opting rock musicians or launching the quasi-satirical show Kuhnia 
mentioned above). Interestingly, this approach was introduced retroactively to create an 
illusion of a plurality of voices, rather than proactively as in Russia, to preempt the 
emergence of alternative narratives and ‘occupy’ available public space. It seems that no 
matter how much control is exerted over new media, global media flows (e.g. scenes of 
the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan in Kiev) cannot be suppressed and other sources 
of subversive protest (e.g. involving steb) cannot be ignored. As Soviet-style crude 
suppression of dissenting voices does not work, the regime attempts to diversify its 




The investigation of the issues raised in this article is instructive for our 
understanding of the dynamics of control and the democratising potential of the online 
sphere in societies with semi/authoritarian regimes. It draws our attention to the fluidity 
of state strategies in dealing with new media and adopting more sophisticated control 
mechanisms. It highlights the possibilities and evaluates the dangers of appropriating 
online space(s) and de-legitimising the nature of freedom of expression online. Diverse 
regime tactics are observed in both the countries studied: predominantly crude policing 
and marginalisation of peripheral online voices in Belarus; more sophisticated control in 
Ukraine. Imposed obstacles for production and dissemination of political satire, constrain 
the diversity and sustainability of satirical projects in Belarus, as well as limit their topics 
(e.g. the mostly anti-presidential theme of the satire). Meanwhile, the relative freedom of 
the Ukrainian mediascape results in more diverse cases of political satire, which involve 
the appropriation of various genres and aesthetics, as well as gradual de-politicisation.  
In semi-authoritarian states the Internet can potentially offer an alternative space 
outside the restricted political public sphere. By embracing a wider range of voices, new 
media acquire the dual potential to challenge and/or authenticate the state’s ideological 
line. This article’s focus on the former reveals the following. In the case of Ukraine, the 
maximum flexibility of discourse enabled by new media works against consolidation of 
civic society as it prompts its fragmentation and virtualization. The online environment in 
Belarus demonstrates the limitations of discursive inconsistency and plurality online and 
questions the role of alternative channels for the public’s tongue-in-cheek political 
communication. 
In both cases, online satire creates an ‘illusory’ democracy. Although the alternative 
voices are present, they are marginalised. As access to online resources in these countries 
is still limited, with TV remaining the main source of information, political satire online 
preaches to the ‘converted’. The expanding powers of state surveillance contribute to 
(offline) intimidation of the producers of political satire and promote a general sense of 
panopticon and pervasive self-censorship. In the Belarusian case this is especially 
evident, as the alternative voices are intimidated, weakened and disjointed. The third-
generation controls in Ukraine are combined with pluralism and competition within the 
Ukrainian media cloud, which results in the proliferation of various voices and their 
subsequent fragmentation, with some of them lost and ignored. In both cases, state 
control over the Internet affects grassroots political satire. This might lead to further de-
politicisation of online satire. Alternatively, it might result in more subversive use of new 
media by various online activists (similar to the already mentioned Soviet practice of 
steb) or a so-called ‘virtual struggle’—in Morozov’s terms, something close to 
‘slacktivism’ (2011). 
Finally, the global media-sphere of which both countries are part is a constant 
source of alternative narratives. This factor should also be taken into account. In the age 
of media convergence, relationships between new and old media, global and local, are 
becoming more and more complex. This ever increasing complexity of information flows 
is bound to multiply contradictions and intensify multi-directional intercultural dialogue 
of imagery and texts. All parties involved (the state, grassroots actors, etc.) have to 
constantly address these multiple (transnational) flows of meaning and online discourses. 
During this process they might become internally and multiply fractured, (as in the 
example involving Yanukovich’s imagery where the leader of the nation cannot control 
the meanings linked to his image, thus losing his ‘authority’ and slipping from his/her 
‘pedestal’). Whether this process results in some sort of ‘sustainable pluralism’ (thus 
preventing further de-legitimisation of the nature of freedom of expression online in 
semi-authoritarian states) remains an open question. 
The findings of this article contribute to our understanding of new media’s potential 
for the (co)production of citizenship. The following conclusion can be drawn regarding 
the conditions under which the Internet becomes an effective tool for democratization and 
civic mobilization. In both country cases, the points at which relatively passive networks 
of individuals are galvanized into particular online action (both producing and consuming 
political satire online) are triggered by ‘extraordinary’ events in the offline world, such as 
the dispersal of demonstrations in Belarus and the egging of the presidential candidate in 
Ukraine. It is equally if not more important to consider how ‘online events’ (such as 
satirical scandals) trigger ‘offline events’, such as meaningful acts of resistance and/or 
the creation of new solidarities. This aspect of the dynamic between off- and online civic 
and political engagement should be pursued further. So far, one cannot claim that new 
media are fostering the gradual (and organic) accumulation of grassroots initiatives into a 
more engaged and networked public space. Likewise, there is no guarantee of 
straightforward progression from having an aspiration or point of view informed and 
inspired by online satire to acting on it (Day, 2011:146). Future research should look into 
these dilemmas, which hold not only for semi-authoritarian states but are also valid for 









                                                 
1
 Freedom House rankings in 2009 (1-7 scale, 7 is not free) were 6.5 in Belarus and 4.39 for Ukraine. Their 
rankings in 2013 were the following: Belarus remained on the same level of ‘not free’ (with score 6.5) and 
Ukraine’s score decreased to 3.5 (partly free). 
2
 E.g. an online public protest after the unfair use of force by traffic police leading to a successful offline 
campaign in Belarus (Lobodenko and Kozlik, 2008). 
3
 Semetko and Krasnoboka (2003:79) state that ‘while democratic principles, norms and procedures may be 
admired, the political party, a primary institutional feature of established democracies, is not’. 
4
 Fossato et al. (2008) found the following patterns within online media in Russia (which currently is 
‘fail[ing]’ to mobiles the masses): 1) “[the] information mobilizes mainly closed clusters of like-minded 
users who only on rare occasions are able and willing to cooperate with other groups” (53); 2) the online 
media also suffer from increasing self-censorship, as the individuals often are contacted by Russian state 
officials and pressured to conform to ‘rules’. 
5
 Fossato et al. (2008) states that the online media also suffer from increasing self-censorship, as the 
individuals often are contacted by Russian state officials and pressured to conform to ‘rules’. 
6
 E.g. the closure of political shows such as Vremena (Miazhevich, 2012) and even ‘state-endorsed’ 
programmes such as Prozhektorperishilton, 2008-2012 (Taratuta, 2005), an analogue of British Have I Got 
News for You. 
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